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TORTS, CONTRACTS, PROPERTY, STATUS, CHARACTER-
IZATION, AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
FOWLER V. HARPER*
This is a formidable title, involving areas where angels fear to tread.
Nevertheless, some of us are foolish enough to rush in. A few years ago
Dean Prosser, for example, somehow got himself tangled up in a conflict of
laws problem involving torts. "[ C] onflict of laws," he said, "is a dismal swamp,
filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric pro-
fessors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incompre-
hensible jargon."' After pushing the problem around the swamp for sixty
pages, he came to the startling conclusion that "something will have to be
done about all this."2
It is doubtful that this conclusion is sound. It is true that there are
many knotty problems here. It is also true that the law of conflict of laws is
a complicated apparatus difficult if not impossible to reduce to satisfactory
black letter and one that requires considerable skill to manipulate. At the
same time, in the hands of a competent judge, it is, perhaps more than most
branches of law, capable of meeting the requirements of justice. Let us
look at some of the possibilities.
To begin at the beginning, conflict of laws rules are formulated in terms
of categories or classifications of law, on the one hand, and of connecting
factors or "contact points," on the other. Right here we have a difficulty, and
it is not trivial. There is a whole literature on the subject.8 This article is
intended as no more than a footnote to that literature as it relates to problems
in torts.
Every science begins with classification. But law is only somewhat
scientific. A lawyer need not be very sophisticated to realize that the admin-
istration of law is as much an art as a science. Law reflects a way of life.
Even after von Jhering, it is not trite to refer to it as a means to an end. The
"ends" have little to do with science. Nor do we need the authority of Holmes
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to recognize that the life of the law is not logic. Holmes notwithstanding, it
is not exclusively experience either, except in the broadest connotation of that
word, and even then we must include the hopes and aspirations of the com-
munity against the backdrop of its customs, mores, traditions, and superstitions.
Nevertheless, most of the world, and particularly our part of it, is committed
to striving for order in law in order to bring order in life. Thus we have legal
classifications. But the lines are dim, and there is much gray between the
black and the white. Where do "torts" end and "contracts" begin? Where
do we pass from "property" law into "tort" law? Where is the line that
separates the law of "torts" from the law of "administration of decedent's
estates"? It is a problem of classification; in the "incomprehensible jargon"
of conflict of laws, "characterization." We have similar problems in identify-
ing the contact points---"domicile," "nationality," "the place of wrong, .... place
of contracting," and even "situs."
Suppose, for example, an action is brought in state A for breach of a
promise to marry which was made in state B by a citizen of B and broken in
state C by his marriage there to a female domiciliary of A. The man
has an excuse for not fulfilling his promise under B law but not under
C or A law. Under the A conflict of laws rules, the validity of a contract
and excuses for nonperformance are governed by the law of the place where
the contract was made (B) ; tort law is governed by the place of wrong (C).
Under A and C law, the breach of a promise to marry involves liability for
breach of contract, but under B law it involves tort liability. If the question
is regarded as one of contract law, B law will control and defendant will not
be liable.4 If it is treated as a matter of tort law, C law will govern and he
probably will be liable, notwithstanding that under C law it is not characterized
as a tort. The preliminary question is: By what law will the characterization
be made? The question, of course, must be answered by the court of the forum.5
Again, let us consider a Missouri case6 which was brought under the
Oklahoma wrongful death statute because the injury was received in Okla-
homa. A provision of the Oklahoma constitution required that the question
of contributory negligence be decided by the jury. In Missouri the judge
had the power to direct a verdict on this question. Under Oklahoma decisions
that state's constitutional provision concerned a matter of procedure, 7 but
4. This assumes that the court in A will not refer to the "whole law" of the foreign
state. Cf. University of Chicago v. Dater, 277 Mich. 658, 270 N.W. 175 (1936).
5. See DIcEY, CONFLICT op LAWs 43 (7th ed. 1958).
6. Hopkins v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 41, 171 S.W.2d 625 (1943).
7. It should be pointed out that the Oklahoma case, Independent Cotton Oil Co.
v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 Pac. 969 (1911), on which the Missouri court primarily
relied in holding that it was dealing with a procedural rule, involved the retroactive
application of a constitutional provision. The Oklahoma court had upheld the applica-
tion of the provision on the ground that no one had a vested right in a rule of procedure.
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Missouri characterized such provisions as matters of substantive law. Under
the Missouri and Oklahoma conflict of laws rules, all matters of procedure
were governed by the law of the forum. The court employed the Oklahoma
characterization and held that the Missouri law on the direction of a verdict
was controlling. If the court had followed the characterization of the Missouri
law, the Oklahoma rule would have applied.
There are various solutions offered for these problems,8 but about the
only thing that can be said with confidence on the subject is that the law is
probably unsettled in all jurisdictions. Perhaps one sensible approach is
that the forum should follow its own characterization with one or two excep-
tions.9 The basis for this solution is obvious. Whatever policy has prompted
the forum to adopt a particular choice of law rule would be distorted if the
characterization of some foreign law were adopted. For example, if the law
of the forum provides that the law of the place of wrong governs liability
in tort but some other law determines what is the place of wrong, the forum
policy in selecting the place of wrong as the governing law may be subverted.
Similarly, if the forum rules are that the place of wrong governs tort liability
but the place of making a contract determines contract liability, the forum
loses control over the situation if a foreign law determines whether the case
is one of tort or contract liability. In the Missouri-Oklahoma case set forth
above, the Missouri (forum) rule that its courts follow local procedure is
subverted if the Oklahoma law dictates what law is procedure and what is
substance.' 0
A similar problem exists where there is a difference in the characteriza-
tion or delimitation of the connecting factors. The law of states A and B
might bd identical in that the place where a contract is made governs its
validity and interpretation. But in the case of an offer from B to an office
Regardless of the desirability of the result in the Missouri case, it seems clear that
the court fell into error in assuming without discussion that the word "procedure"has the same meaning in all contexts. See Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
The Massachusetts court fell into the same error in Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600,
124 N.E. 477 (1919), which involved the question whether the Massachusetts statute
placing the burden of proof on the defendant in a negligence case should be applied when
the accident occurred in Rhode Island. The court held it applicable as a rule of
procedure, relying on a previous case which involved the constitutionality of an applica-
tion of the statute. It well may be that the distinction between "substance" and "pro-
cedure" should be drawn at different places when it serves different purposes.
8. See DrcaE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 45-52 (7th ed. 1958).
9. The usual exceptions are: (1) the situs of tangible things determines whether
the law will deal with them as movable or immovable property; and (2) if two
potentially applicable laws characterize an issue in the same way, that characterization
will be accepted although it differs from that of the forum. See RonERTSON, op. cit. supra
note 3. at 75-78.
10. According to the usage of some writers, this is a problem of secondary character-
ization. The initial or primary characterization was made before any reference could be
made to the substantive law of Oklahoma.
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in A by correspondence and an acceptance mailed in A, different results will
be obtained if under A law the contract is "made" in A where the acceptance
was dispatched and under B law it is made in B where the acceptance was
received."' Here again, whether the forum is A or B, the policy of the
local law is defeated if the foreign characterization of the connecting factor is
followed.
When it comes to choice of law, the most popular rule for torts is that
the law of the "place of wrong" governs questions of substantive law. But
where is the "place of wrong"? It is said in the Restatement and in a
number of cases that the place of wrong is the place where the last act or
event necessary to liability for an alleged tort takes place.' 2 But this a rubric,
not one of the Ten Commandments.
In the easiest of cases, the "place of wrong" rule is probably about as
good as any other. If a man injures another in India, the average person in
the western world is quite likely to believe that he should not be brought
to term in England, Connecticut, or New York by any law other than that
of India. Of course, there is the "public policy" principle, 13 but since India
is a nation at least as civilized as our own, there should seldom be a serious
problem here. When we are faced with a multi-state tort, however, the
difficulty increases.
Suppose that a cow is raised in Texas and shipped to Chicago where
it is slaughtered and packed. The meat is sent by the packing company to
all the states in the United States, England, and India. The meat is not
edible and has not been subjected to the statutory processing and testing
required by the state of Illinois. A housewife in Connecticut, England, or
India (a Muslim) buys a part of this animal, becomes ill as a result of the
contamination, and brings an action against the packing company. Where
is the "place of wrong"? According to the rubric, it is where the "last act
or event" occurred. This would be in Connecticut, England, or India, where
we will assume there are no statutory requirements similar to those of Illinois.
11. Compare It re Missouri S.S. Co., 42 Ch. D. 321 (C.A. 1889), with Liverpool &
Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
12. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). Alabama G. So. R.R. v. Carroll,
97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892), is the leading case. Others are cited in GOODRICH, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 263 (3d ed. 1949), where an attempt is made to justify the rule on
analytical grounds. "The plaintiff does not sue the defendant for the latter's negligence,
but because the negligence has caused the plaintiff harm." Ibid. But this does not make
very good sense, for it could as well be said that the plaintiff does not sue the defendant
because the latter caused the plaintiff harm but because he negligently caused harm.
In such cases, both factors are essential to the cause of action.
13. This refers to the rationale which, allows the forum to decline to apply the
otherwise applicable law under its choice of law rule because its application would offend
a deep-seated public policy of the forum. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N.E. 198 (1918) ; Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L.Q.




It would offend almost anyone's sense of justice if the packing company could
escape liability merely because the plaintiff lives in Connecticut, England,
or India, rather than Illinois. 4 Although some literal-minded courts have
failed to find liability, it has not overtaxed the imagination of others to find
that the "place of wrong" was the place where the tortious behavior occurred,
rather than the place where the plaintiff sustained harm.'0
In the case of harm to persons or physical things, it is usually not too
difficult to identify the place where the last act or event necessary to liability
occurred. But in the case of harm to relational interests or intangible things,
it becomes more complicated. A case involving alienation of affections is
illustrative of the difficulties. A young naval officer and his wife are domiciled
in Pennsylvania. When he is ordered abroad, she moves to Boston and gets
a job in a navy yard. In Massachusetts she falls in love with another officer,
divorces her husband, and remarries. On his return the ex-husband sues his
successful rival in a federal court in Massachusetts. Such an action is barred
by Pennsylvania, which has a "heart balm" statute. The common law prevails
in Massachusetts. Where was the "place of wrong"? In a sense the plaintiff
"lost" his wife's affections in Massachusetts where she fell in love with the
defendant. It may plausibly be argued, however, that his "loss" of consortium
was in his domicile (which was also the "matrimonial domicile"), Penn-
sylvania. 16
The fraud cases also present difficulties. A case in a federal court in
New Jersey, Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co.,17 may be regarded
as typical. Plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant pursuant to which
he acquired the exclusive right to sell defendant's fuel oil in a certain county
in New Jersey. Several years later he sold his business to defendant by a
contract which recited all moneys purportedly due between the parties. The
14. An even more absurd result could conceivably be brought about if Connecticut
had legislation similar to that of Illinois, but in a case before it the Connecticut court
would decline to apply the Illinois statutes on the ground that they were applicable only
when the injury was sustained in Illinois (the "place of wrong") and would not invoke
the Connecticut statutes because they were applicable only to meat processed in Con-
necticut.
15. In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957), the
court held the Minnesota Dram Shop Act applicable in a case where liquor was sold
to an intoxicated person in Minnesota, but the automobile accident in which plaintiff
sustained injury was in Wisconsin. Compare Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting
Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 AtI. 163 (1928), in which a Connecticut statute imposing
vicarious liability upon the bailor-for-hire of an automobile was applied to an out-of-
state accident because the transaction of bailment had taken place in Connecticut.
16. See Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), where Massachusetts
law was applied. If the case is considered on a policy basis, it may be asked which
state's law should apply on the grounds of state "interest." Pennsylvania certainly
has an interest in the rights of Pennsylvania spouses against third persons who interfere
with their domestic relations. On the other hand, Massachusetts has a legitimate con-
cern with the extent to which a single man in Massachusetts may be permitted to
compete with a husband for the affections of his wife.
17. 128 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1942) (Goodrich, J.).
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agreement was consummated at the defendant's home office in Connecticut.
Shortly thereafter plaintiff discovered that defendant had permitted another
company to sell its products in plaintiff's territory while the agreement was
in effect. Plaintiff sued for the commissions paid the other party, alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation in the closing sale. It was held that under the
rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkinis' the federal court in New Jersey must apply
the New Jersey conflict of laws rule and that that rule in tort actions was
that the law of the place of wrong governs. It was further held that the place
of wrong in cases of fraud and deceit is the place where the loss was sus-
tained.19 The court then said:
The alleged loss here is the sale of plaintiff's business for an inade-
quate consideration, settlement for commissions at a sum substan-
tially less than actually due and the damage resulting therefrom.
Since the event which occasioned these losses was the execution of
the contract of sale in Connecticut, reference must be made to the
law of Connecticut to determine whether the plaintiff has established
the substantive elements of its claimed cause of action for deceit.20
But it would seem that although Connecticut was the place where the fraudu-
lent representations were made,21 the loss of plaintiff's business and com-
missions was in New Jersey, his business territory.
In cases involving contractual transactions, there is still more elasticity.22
To be sure, again some courts are rigid, following the "place of making" or
"place of performance" rule. For the most part, however, it is the "proper"
law which is applied. And what is the "proper" law? In England, almost
invariably, it is the law intended or presumed to have been intended by the
parties.23 Of course, the "presumed intention" is frequently pure fiction.
American courts are apt to find the proper law (although they do not use the
term) to be the law of the state or country which has the most significant
contacts-the center of gravity of the transaction.2 4
In dealing with property interests in tangible things, the law of the
physical situs is the customary rule in Anglo-American conflict of laws. 25
18. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. Citing RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 note pt. 4 (1934), 2 BEALE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377.2 (1935), and several cases.
20. 128 F.2d at 699.
21. The Restatement provision cited in the opinion, § 377, is as follows: "When
a person sustains loss by fraud, the place of wrong is where the loss is sustained, not
where fraudulent representations are made." (Emphasis added.)
22. See Ehrenzweig, The Real Estate Broker and the Conflict of Laws, 59 CoLTJM.
L. REv. 303 (1959).
23. See DICEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 717-38 (7th ed. 1958).
24. E.g., W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E2d 417 (1945) ; Auten
v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
25. Thomson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897) ; Cammell v. Sewell, 5 Hurl. &
N. 728, 157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (Ex. 1860) ; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 211 (1934).
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Intangibles, such as debts, insofar as they are dealt with as "property," must
necessarily be treated differently, although formerly the fiction of situs was
often employed.
Initially, then, a court faced with a conflict of laws case must identify
or characterize it as to the proper legal category; otherwise it will not know
which choice of law rule to apply. It cannot refer to the appropriate law
unless it knows what kind of a problem it has on its hands. So indistinct
are the lines of demarcation that frequently a court may have several plausible
choices.
Judge Learned Hand took advantage of the availability of several alterna-
tives in the following case.26 While insolvent, a bankrupt had entered into
contracts in New York to transfer real and personal property in Missouri,
Florida, and New Jersey to four of its creditors. The transfers were made
accordingly. Since the property was not recoverable as a preference under
the bankruptcy act, the trustee sought relief under a New York statute which
made preferential transfers of this character invalid. It was conceded that
the transfers were or might be valid under the laws of Missouri, Florida, and
New Jersey. One could expect the court to apply the law of the situs. Not so,
however. The court rendered a personal decree against the transferees order-
ing them to convey the property to the trustee. It characterized the problem
as tort or contract, probably the former. Judge Hand reasoned:
Although the bill does not say where the transfers were made, the
contracts required them to be delivered in [New York] . . . and
we are to assume that the parties performed as stipulated. The
receipt of the deeds by the defendants was therefore a wrong, and
any liability imposed as a remedy would be recognized and enforced
elsewhere, for the law of the place where acts occur normally fixes
their jural character .... The question here is whether it makes a
difference that the wrong consisted in the conveyance of property
in another state, under whose laws the conveyance might perhaps
have been valid. It is in general no obiection to a liabiity arising
out of a consensual transaction that it may be determined by events
happening in another jurisdiction.
27
The second italicized sentence sounds more like contract, the first more like
tort. However, in a later part of the opinion, he apparently returns to the
tort idea: "The law of New York might still make receipt of the deed a wrong
and impose a liability upon the grantee though he got a good title. "28 And
near the end he declares that "the validity of the conveyance depends on the
lex rei sitae, but any court may compel the tortfeasor specifically to restore
the property, whatever the law of the situs. ' '29
26. Irving Trust Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 83 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1936).
27. Id. at 171. (Emphasis added.)
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 172.
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IRegardless of the double talk, it is obvious that the court felt that the
interests of justice required the transferees to yield their preferences for
equitable distribution. Characterization of .the problem as one of tort made
such a decision possible.
The automobile industry has left a long trail in the conflict of laws,
ever since the courts held that a bona fide purchaser of a horse mortgaged
in another state took a title superior to that of the mortgagee.30 Horse and
buggy lien law has given way in the conflict of laws to what we call progress. 31
A Michigan case32 is typical: An action for conversion of an automobile was
brought by a New York mortgagee against a Detroit dealer who had bought
the vehicle from the mortgagor. The mortgage had. been properly recorded
in New York but not in Michigan. Overruling a prior (horse) case, the
court held that the mortgagee should be protected at the expense of the
innocent buyer. This is now the usual rule in the United States.33
In most of these cases the courts do not discuss the conflict of laws rules
relating to torts. Usually the language is in terms of "property," "security,"
or "situs." In Federman v. Verni,34 however, the court made the usual tort
analysis. The plaintiff had bought a truck in Philadelphia from a mortgagor.
Both mortgagor and mortgagee were New York residents and the mortgage
had been executed there. The defendant mortgagee repossessed the truck on
default by the mortgagor. Under the law of New York the mortgagee was
protected, but under Pennsylvania law the bona fide purchaser for value was
protected. The federal court in New York held that (1) the action was for
conversion; (2) the New York choice of law rule was that the law of the
place where the wrongdoer's conduct occurs determines liability; (3) the
conversion took place in Pennsylvania; and (4) Pennsylvania law controlled
and the plaintiff recovered.
Now consider the Rogers case in the federal district court for Minne-
sota.3 5 The federal government loaned money and received a chattel mortgage
on certain cattle located in Wisconsin. Thereafter the mortgagor delivered
the animals to a livestock commission merchant in Minnesota, who sold them
in the usual course of his trade. The Government sued the commission agent
for conversion. The court examined the law of conversion in both Minnesota
and Wisconsin and found that under Minnesota law such a sale was a con-
version but that under Wisconsin law it was not. If the court had followed
30. See, e.g., Allison v. Teeters, 176 Mich. 216, 142 N.W. 340 (1913).
31. See Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA.
L. REv. 455 (1948).
32. Metro-Plan, Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N.W. 304 (1941).
33. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 268 (1934) ; Leary, &upra note 31.
34. 42 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
35. United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 36 F. Supp. 79 (D. Minn. 1941).
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the rule of the "place of wrong," it would have applied Minnesota law. It
was there that the defendant exercised "dominion" over the chattels by selling
and delivering them to the buyer. But the court did not apply Minnesota
law. It reasoned as follows:
The action is in tort. It is argued by the government that the
conversion took place in the State of Minnesota. The general rule
is that the creation and extent of tort liability is governed by the
law of the place where the tort was committed, that the action is
transitory and may be brought wherever the wrongdoer may be
found and jurisdiction obtained, but the law of the place where the
right was acquired or the liability incurred will control as to the
right of action ...
The right of the plaintiff to maintain this action for conversion
must depend necessarily upon the rights granted to him under the
law of Wisconsin. The chattel mortgage given on property in Wis-
consin is the foundation of those rights ...
The gist of an action in conversion is a wrongful assumption
of dominion and control over property. The law of Wisconsin is
that neither a sale by the mortgagor of property subject to a chattel
mortgage, nor a subsequent sale by his vendee constitutes a con-
version of the property described in the chattel mortgage ...
It is my opinion that the question of the right of the mortgagee
to maintain this action in conversion goes to the substantive rights
of the parties. Determination of this question involves an interpre-
tation of the rights, which plaintiff here claims were violated, and
which were created under the chattel mortgage. We must be guided
by the interpretation of those rights of the plaintiff under this Wis-
consin chattel mortgage by the decisions of the State of Wisconsin,
which, under the circumstances we have in this case, say that no
rights of a chattel mortgage contract have been violated.3 0
At first reading this appears to be confused reasoning, and the language
indeed sounds odd. The court states that the action is one for conversion,
but it later finds for the defendant because "no rights of a chattel mortgage
contract have been violated." The average lawyer may momentarily be
puzzled when told that the question whether a conversion has been committed
depends on whether there has been a breach of contract. On second thought,
however, he will remember that in a number of instances such is the case.
Misdelivery by a carrier,37 unlawful disposition by a bailee, 88 and improper
use of a chattel by a baileesO are common examples. What makes the Rogers
36. Id. at 80-81.
37. RFSTATEMENT, TORTS § 234 .(1934). Dean Prosser has assembled a large number
of situations in which there is no tort unless there is a breach of contract. PRossm,
op. cit. *tpra note 1, at 402-52.
38. RESTATEmENT, ToRTS § 232 (1934).
39. Id. § 228.
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case appear unusual is the application of this type of analysis in characterizing
a problem for conflict of laws purposes.
It could be argued, as no doubt counsel for the Government did argue,
that this is a simple case of conflict of laws involving torts. The chattel
alleged to have been converted was in Minnesota at the time, the defendant's
acts were done in Minnesota, and as a result the plaintiff was deprived of its
property. Surely the place of wrong was Minnesota. From another point of
view, since Minnesota was the situs of the chattel at the time of the acts in
question, it would appear that under conflict of laws principles Minnesota
law should determine whether the acts were or were not sufficient to deprive
the plaintiff of his property rights and vest title in another.
But the court's decision, although perhaps not all of its language, can
be explained to make good sense. It may well be that the court did not
adequately state the law of Minnesota. It is true that the Minnesota cases
held that it was a conversion to sell mortgaged chattels without the consent of
the mortgagee and without the vendee's knowledge of the lien. But the broader
principle of Minnesota law no doubt is that dealing with a chattel in such
a manner as to deprive another of his property interests therein is a con-
version. It is necessary, therefore, to determine just what those property
interests are. Whatever property the mortgagee had in the chattels was ac-
quired in Wisconsin, which was the situs of the chattels and the place of the
transaction, i.e., the conveyance. The Wisconsin conveyance created in the
mortgagee certain rights, powers, privileges, and immunities-a whole
"bundle" of them-with respect to this chattel, vis A vis both the mortgagor
and the rest of the world under Wisconsin law, which appears by all odds to be
the "proper" law of the contract and the situs of the chattel at the time. Simul-
taneously, it destroyed an equivalent "bundle" in the mortgagor. The problem
is whether the transaction created in the mortgagee a right which is violated
if a bona fide bailee or vendee of the mortgagor sells the chattel to a bona fide
purchaser? When the case is analyzed as a conveyancing or property problem,
it is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the Wisconsin law should
be controlling.
Two New Jersey cases present a nice study in characterization and the
confusion which can result if the problem is not understood. In the first, the
Marvin case, 40 a Pennsylvanian sold a safe in Pennsylvania to a resident of
New Jersey, retaining title in himself as security for the balance of the
purchase price. The buyer subsequently sold the safe to a bona fide purchaser
in New Jersey. The conditional seller then sued the second purchaser in
New Jersey for conversion. Under the local Pennsylvania law a bona fide
40. Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N.J.L. 410, 7 AtI. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1886).
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purchaser prevailed over a conditional seller in such circumstances. The New
Jersey law was otherwise-the purchaser from a conditional vendee acquired
only such rights and title as his vendor had. New Jersey law was applied.
In the second, the Krimke case,41 plaintiff delivered a diamond ring to
a jewelry broker in New York for examination. The broker took the ring to
New Jersey and sold it to the defendant, who paid value with no knowledge
or notice of the broker's want of title. Under the New York Factor's Act,
a bona fide purchaser under the conditions of this case prevailed over the
owner. Under New Jersey law, the owner prevailed. The New Jersey court
applied New York law, and defendant kept the ring.
In Krimke, the court thought it was following the principle of the Marvin
case. Under the New York transaction, the broker acquired a certain aggre-
gate of rights, powers, privileges, and immunities. One of the powers was
to convey a good title to a good faith purchaser. This, according to the
decision, enabled him to convey such a title in New Jersey. In other words,
this power accompanied him and the ring into New Jersey. "He had control
of the title, under the law of the state of New York, as did plaintiff in the
Marvin Case, under the Pennsylvania law.
' '42
If this argument is stated fast enough, it carries an overtone of plausi-
bility. But on second thought, something is wrong. In the Marvin case,
as in the Krimke case, the person in possession of the chattel when it was
sold to the bona fide purchaser had the power to endow defendant with a
complete property interest under the law of the state of the first transaction
but not under the New Jersey law. What the court in Krinke apparently
did not realize was that it was giving effect in New Jersey to the powers
acquired by the bailee under New York law, whereas in Marvin the court
confined to Pennsylvania the exercise of the conditional vendee's power
acquired under Pennsylvania law to invest a bona fide purchaser with a
good title.
Here again, an oversimplified characterization of the problem could
result in the following syllogism. Defendant's liability in each case depends
on whether he has converted plaintiff's property. Conversion is a tort. The
lex loci delicti determines whether a tort has been committed. The alleged
conversion occurred in New Jersey. New Jersey law applies. The result
obtained in the Marvin case is consistent with this analysis. The Krimke
case is not.
A more sophisticated approach would call for an inquiry into the nature
and extent of the plaintiff's "property" which he alleges has been "converted."
41. Charles E. Dougherty Co. v. Krimke, 105 N.J.L. 470, 144 At. 617 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1929).
42. Id. at 474, 144 AtI. at 618.
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It is to be observed that in the Marvin case, the conditional vendor was in
a better position and received greater protection than if the safe had been
sold to a good faith purchaser in Pennsylvania. -Under the result of that
case, the conditional vendor's "property rights" magically increased when
the safe crossed the state line into New Jersey. Thus, the defendant com-
mitted a tort by buying the safe in New Jersey, whereas if it had been a
Pennsylvania transaction before the safe had been taken out of the state,
his purchase would not have been tortious. The alternative analysis calls
for a double characterization, viz., splitting the problem into its "tort" aspect,
on the one hand, and its "property" or "contract" aspect, on the other,-and
applying the appropriate conflict of laws rule to each.
When the action is between the original parties to the transaction, even
though the action is for conversion the contract characterization may be
indicated so clearly that most courts could be expected not to miss it. In
Thomas G. Jewett, Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co.,i 3 a gasoline shovel which
had been sold under a conditional sale contract in Massachusetts but which
had been delivered to the buyer in New Hampshire was repossessed by the
seller in New Hampshire on the buyer's default and resold in Connecticut.
The conditional buyer sued the seller in Massachusetts alleging that the seller
had committed a conversion by the Connecticut sale. Under Massachusetts
law the buyer's right of redemption terminated fifteen days after repossession,
but under New Hampshire law notice of sale was required and no such
notice had been given. The court made no mention of Connecticut law. The
case was dealt with solely as a conflict of laws case involving contracts. The
court held that it was a Massachusetts contract, since it was made in that
state, and that, accordingly, New Hampshire law was inapplicable.
There was a dissenting opinion which took the position that New Hamp-
shire law should have been applied because the shovel was delivered to the
plaintiff in New Hampshire, which was thus the situs when the plaintiff's
rights were acquired. It seems clear that the dissenting judge, in relying
upon situs as the contact point, was characterizing the situation as one in-
volving primarily the law of property.
There are, of course, several lines of cases in which an action either
in tort or in contract is allowed. If they involve a conflict of laws problem,
the characterization may be vital. In a Kentucky case,44 plaintiff bought a
railroad ticket in Louisville for Atlantic City and return. He was injured
in an accident in Pennsylvania. In a New York case,45 plaintiff had bought
43. 282 Mass. 469, 185 N.E. 369 (1933).
44. Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. Ry. v. Groin, 142 Ky. 51, 133 S.W. 977 (1911).
See also PROSSER, op. cit. upra note 1, at 422.
45. Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871). See also Boulevard Airport, Inc. v.
Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp., 85 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1949) ; Conklin v. Cana-
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a ticket in Buffalo to New York City. He too was injured in an accident
in Pennsylvania. The Kentucky court characterized the problem as tort and
applied Pennsylvania law. The New York court characterized it as contract
and applied New York law. Of course in both cases there was both a breach
of contract and a tort (assuming negligence on the part of the carrier).
Formerly the form of action or the characterization adopted by the pleader
might have been controlling. Under modern procedure, it would seem to be
immaterial which label the plaintiff has put on his case so long as he has
stated facts which constitute some kind of a cause of action under the proper
law. The careful and knowledgeable lawyer will analyze his case and the
competing laws which could be applicable and characterize his case accord-
ingly.
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the label or tag applied
to a transaction and the characterization of its substance. This is brought
out neatly in two conversion cases. One involved the validity of a Michigan
transaction in an Illinois forum.46 The defendant argued that the contract
was invalid because it was unrecorded. Under Michigan law it was a chattel
mortgage, but under Illinois law it was a conditional sale. The court disposed
of the problem with the following language:
In this case the contract specifically provides that the law of
Michigan shall be applicable. Under Michigan law, although the
instrument is held to be a chattel mortgage, recording is not neces-
sary. On the other hand, if we regard the law of Illinois as appli-
cable, the agreement is one for a conditional sale which by the law
of Illinois need not be recorded. Therefore, whether we regard the
law of Michigan or of Illinois as applicable, and whether we regard
the agreement as a chattel mortgage in Michigan or a conditional
sales agreement in Illinois, it was unnecessary that the agreement
be recorded. There is no statute in Illinois requiring an instrument
to be recorded in this state solely because under Michigan law it
would be denominated a chattel mortgage. The character of the
instrument rather than the name given it would seem to be deter-
minative.47
In a federal case,48 the respective states were reversed: an Illinois
contract of sale and a Michigan forum. Under the law of Illinois it was a
conditional sale, but under Michigan law it was a chattel mortgage. Again
the issue was one of recording. The court reasoned:
dian-Colonial Airways, 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935); Rauton v. Pullman Co.,
183 S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937); Gilliland & Gaffney v. Southern Ry., 85 S.C. 26,
67 S.E. 20 (1910).
46. Ford Motor Co. v. National Bond & Inv. Co., 294 Ill. App. 585, 14 N.E.2d 306
(1938).
47. Id. at 596, 14 N.E.2d at 311.
48. Enterprise Optical Mfg. Co. v. Timmer, 71 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1934).
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The fallacy in the appellant's contention is that it confuses the
label with the goods, and nomenclature with substance. Michigan
does not require the recording of conditional sale contracts, but
its courts do not include within the definition of conditional sales
contracts those in which two cumulative and inconsistent remedies
. * are reserved. The claimant's contention is that, because the
Illinois courts designate agreements such as are here involved
conditional sales contracts, it necessarily follows that the contract
is such in Michigan--clearly a non sequitur.
49
Strange conflicts capers are sometimes performed by the courts in order
to achieve a result which conforms to their conception of justice in the case
before them. An English case5 ° is illustrative. An action was brought against
the English executrix of a deceased Austrian who had possessed an estate
in Austrian lands similar to a common law estate tail. It was claimed and
admitted that certain waste had been committed by the decedent. There was
no doubt about defendant's liability under Austrian law, but the action was
in an English court, and the question arose whether the action sounded in
tort or in contract. Defendant claimed that it was a tort action analogous
to waste, which, according to English law, died with the person. It was held
that the acts of waste were not to be regarded as torts but as breaches of
an obligation in the nature of an implied contract, and the claim was allowed.
In a Louisiana case, 51 the court solved the problem in a manner satis-
factory to itself by ignoring the characterization problem altogether. A
natural shallow drain traversed plaintiff's Arkansas land, extending into
defendant's adjoining Louisiana land. Both parties were residents of
Louisiana. Defendant constructed a dam across the drain on his land, thus
impounding water on plaintiff's land. Under Arkansas law defendant had a
right to prevent the flow onto his land. Under Louisiana law he had no
such right. The action could have been characterized as a nuisance or trespass
under the usual principles, or it could well have been characterized as a
problem of property law. In either case legal orthodoxy would have suggested
Arkansas law. The court apparently thought that one Louisiana citizen
ought not to do this to another, even in Arkansas. It held the defendant
liable under Louisiana law.
What a fertile-minded judge can do with the characterization tool is
nowhere better demonstrated than in the performance of Justice Traynor
in handling a tort case before the Supreme Court of California.52 The char-
49. Id. at 296-97.
50. Batthyany v. Walford, 36 Ch. D. 269 (1887).
51. Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932).
52. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), discussed in Kelso,
Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current Dilemmas, 33 IND. L.J.
297, 305-10 (1958) ; cf. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 47 N.J. Super. 196, 198-99, 135
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acterization problem appears occasionally in connection with choice of law
rules pertaining to contracts and status, but seldom in connection with rules
governing torts and status. Justice Traynor, however, was able to bring
it about deftly. In that case, a suit by minor children against their father,
all of whom apparently were California domiciliaries, was brought in Cali-
fornia for a personal tort committed in Idaho. California law allowed such
claims, but Idaho did not. The classical disposition of this case would be
to look to Idaho law-the place of wrong under any theory-and dismiss
the case. Not so, however, under the Traynor opinion, which represented
the unanimous view of the court. The court declared that the problem was
not one of tort but one of the capacity of a child to sue his parent. This is
a matter of the law of status and such matters are, under orthodox conflict
of laws rules, referred to the law of the domicle, although the law of the forum
is sometimes applied.
The same court, the same judge writing the opinion, held in Grant v.
McAulffe 5 3 that California law applied to determine whether a cause of
action for injuries received in an Arizona automobile accident survived the
death of the alleged tort-feasor. The cases on this point had been divided,
some holding that the question of survival was a matter of substantive law
governed by the place of wrong, others regarding it as procedural and con-
trolled by the law of the forum.
Justice Traynor's position is not clear. At one point he seems to adopt
the procedural characterization. But it also appears that he regards the
question as one of the administration of the decedent's estate:
Decedent's estate is located in this state, and letters of adminis-
tration were issued to defendant by the courts of this state. The
responsibilities of defendant, as administrator of Pullen's estate,
for injuries inflicted by Pullen before his death are governed by the
laws of this state. . . .Today, tort liabilities of the sort involved
in these actions are regarded as compensatory. When, as in the
present case, all the parties were residents of this state, and the
estate of the deceased tort feasor is being administered in this state,
plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the
laws of this state relating to administration of estates. 4
And at another point he says that "the problem here is whether the causes
of action that these 'plaintiffs had against Pullen before his death survive
as liabilities of his estate." 55
A 2d 555, 556-57 (Super. Ct. 1957) (dictum) ; Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the AppF-
cable Law, 52 COLUm. L. Rzv. 959, 975 (1952) ; Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64
HARv. L. Rzv. 881, 885-86 (1951).
53. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), discussed in Kelso, supra note 52, at 317-19.
54. 41 Cal. 2d at 867, 264 P.2d at 949.
55. Id. at 866, 264 P.2d at 949.
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Related to the problem of characterization but distinct .from it is the
so-called incidental question. This arises in a situation where the solution of
the main conflict of laws problem incidentally involves another and subsidiary
conflicts problem. Will the forum apply its own conflict of laws rule to the
subsidiary issue, or will it apply the conflicts rule of the state to which the
main or original question is referred? There are two schools of thought but
not much authority.56
The following hypothetical wrongful death case presents this situation.
An injury resulting in death was sustained in Illinois where decedent and his
family were domiciled at the time. An action is brought in Minnesota under
the Illinois wrongful death statute. The question is raised by the defendant
whether the plaintiff is actually the widow of the decedent, since they were
first cousins, forbidden to marry under the law of Illinois. It is claimed by
plaintiff that the marriage was valid because the ceremony was performed in
Kentucky where marriage between first cousins is valid. Under Minnesota
conflict of laws rules, a marriage valid where performed is valid in Minnesota,
with exceptions which do not affect marriage between first cousins. Under
Illinois law the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act is in force; it provides that
marriages between residents of the state who go through the ceremony in
another state in order to avoid Illinois law are void.
Will the Minnesota court apply its own conflict of laws rule relating to
the validity of marriages, or will it apply the conflicts rule of the place of
wrong (Illinois) to which it referred the main question? In Meisenhelder v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry,57 the Minnesota court applied the conflicts rule of the
place of wrong. That action was brought under the Federal Employers
Liability Act, however, and the decision therefore is not dispositive of the
hypothetical case.
It is quite possible to have a situation in which the incidental question
is still further removed in space and sequence. In the above action for
wrongful death in Minnesota, suppose the doubt as to the validity of the
Kentucky marriage of the Illinois domiciliaries arises not because they were
cousins but because the decedent had had a former wife from whom he had
obtained a divorce in Mexico while he was a resident of Illinois. Neither
Illinois nor Minnesota recognizes Mexican divorces, but let us assume that
Kentucky does. The favored principle with most American conflict of laws
writers is to refer all such problems to the law of the domicile of the parties,58
and probably a court would do the same and apply the law of Illinois, thus
56. See DicEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 57-63 (7th ed. 1958).
57. 170 Minn. 317, 213 N.W. 32 (1927).
58. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 348 (3d ed. 1949).
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denying the woman's status under the wrongful death statute. Here, Illinois
was both the domicile and the place of wrong. If this Illinois decedent had
been killed in Ohio, however, a good argument could be made that the Minne-
sota court should apply Ohio law to determine whether the woman is a
widow. Presumably, when the Ohio law designated the "widow" as a bene-
ficiary under the wrongful death statute, "widow" had the meaning as
understood in the law of Ohio-not in the law of Illinois, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, or Mexico.
To end at the beginning, many problems in the conflict of laws raise
delicate and complicated questions in the borderland between torts, on the
one hand, and contracts, property, status, and other branches of the law, on
the other. This, of course, creates a degree of uncertainty, but at the same
time it lends a compensatory flexibility to the law, gives the courts a plausible
choice of alternatives through the medium of characterization, and thus, it is
submitted, affords an instrument of value for the administration of justice.
